Alessandro Vanoli: "The West and its centrality are an invention of the Spanish Empire."

History did not really begin between the Tigris and the Euphrates with the appearance of the written language , but rather with the construction of the story of the first European history at the end of the 15th century, which coincides not so coincidentally with the overseas explorations of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal and the physical representation of the world on those first maps in which Europe occupied the center. However, in a school in China , the students in the back row are not even able to see our continent, which appears tiny in a corner at the top left: exactly as they have always perceived us.

This is explained to El Confidencial in Madrid by the Italian historian Alessandro Vanoli who has published The Invention of the West: Spain, Portugal, and the Birth of a Culture (Ático de Libros), an essay that goes beyond exposing the key events of the century that would change world history forever, beginning the Modern Age and leaving the Middle Ages behind, to delve into the idea that emerged then of the West as “a thinkable space, beyond the geographical.”

Since then, this space has also carried with it the idea of ​​a centrality that has characterized the universal history created by Westerners: “The classic Mercator projection— the world map —is also functional to an over-dimensioning of the West. But this isn't just a problem for geographers; it's reflected in all the cultural perceptions and historical reconstructions made during that period. Therefore, we can say that it is at that moment that history truly begins,” Vanoli explains.

"The classic Mercator projection (the world map) is also functional for an over-dimensioning of the West."

An idea of ​​the West that, curiously, was initially defined as a society trying to find new routes to reach what they called the East, which is where the true wealth lies: textiles, precious stones, spices... and which never exists, however, as a single space. It is the story of the nascent Spanish empire and a European tradition continued by the French and British until they are displaced by this new representative of the West who, in turn, writes history: "The United States is the direct heir of the British Empire , and that is why its Asian perception is the same: they are the ones who truly write the history of the West." We discuss all this with the professor at the University of Bologna, an expert in the history of the Mediterranean.

QUESTION. The West doesn't exist as a concept at the end of the Middle Ages, but what does exist is a predominance of European trade, such as that of the Italian republics of Venice and Genoa. Is it then, with the fall of Constantinople and the interruption of trade routes that necessitated the exploration of the oceans, that Europe paradoxically begins to be defined?

ANSWER. You could say that at first it was a geographical exploration and nothing more. And it was for everything, in general. That is to say, there is no idea of ​​the West as a conceivable and therefore conquerable space; this is the real difference. The change occurs more or less during that period, at the end of what we know as the Middle Ages, when the route with China was cut off. It can be said without a doubt that the history of the West is determined precisely by the need to reach the East: all commercial activities, all routes, all political, economic, social, and cultural needs had the East as a point of reference, and this was so because everything that produced true wealth came from there: textiles, precious stones, spices... So the need for everyone was to find the best route to reach the East, and at the end of the Middle Ages, these continental routes began to become very problematic. Furthermore, a population explosion occurred in Europe , accompanied by a profound social and economic transformation: the change that determined the presence of the bourgeoisie and merchants as key players in political activities. This occurred throughout the Mediterranean, from Barcelona to Bologna, to name two cities close to us, and forced the search for new routes to access more oriental products...

"The Ottomans determined a shift in power in the Mediterranean and hampered relations with the easternmost stations."

Q. The turning point would then be the emergence of the Ottoman Empire. Was Byzantium really the West, Europe, before it fell?

A. In any sense, it is, but... thank you for this question. It's very interesting, because if we think about all the artistic and cultural legacies of the Middle Ages, Byzantium is always one of the starting points and is perceived as Roman history. There are Venice and Ravenna, to name a few examples where we can see this legacy. But at the same time, from that European perspective, the idea begins to germinate that Byzantium is becoming increasingly distant. This is clearly seen in the midst of the Crusades, when the Venetians decided to conquer Byzantium because they understood that there was something oriental and different about Byzantium, that it was no longer Europe in the strictest sense, and a dividing line began to emerge. As for the Ottomans, they were the main protagonists of this division perceived at the end of the Middle Ages —let's call it that by convention—because they determined a shift in power in the Eastern Mediterranean and hampered relations with the more eastern trading stations that most merchants from Western countries had. We must try, however, to understand this history not as a series of rigorous divisions—because it is true that there is a political distance and a very real distinction between different spaces—but at the same time, most of the men who travel by sea are from all of those countries and are part of the same history.

Q. There comes a point at which the Portuguese and Spanish conquest ceases to be solely for commercial reasons. Does this Western origin also involve a religion against Islam?

A. Yes, you could say that too. But there's a great deal of commercial activity, where everything seems a bit more mixed up, along with political activity where, at least officially, everything seems very easily distinguishable. That is, kings, emperors , sultans... always have to argue that they're fighting against someone, who usually coincides with those who are different in a religious sense, and that it's done for convenience. There's a very ideological aspect to how historians have interpreted the sources for their narrative, and that's similar to how it is today: Can we truly say that what Trump or the Europeans argue against Iran or other countries is true, or is it rather a political need to show differences? The important point is that the history of the West is above all a history of the construction of a thinkable space, which begins to take shape precisely at that moment when navigators' discoveries in the Atlantic Ocean are confronted with new possibilities for conquest. This great global change is reflected in the Treaty of Tordesillas and the division of the world by an entity that is now beginning to take shape as the West.

Q. This idea of ​​the division of the world inevitably leads to the topic of maps, which is a very important part of this book. Are we still stuck in the 16th-century vision of the Mapa Mundi in Europe? Do we still have a European idea of ​​the world based on a physical representation, rather than a real one?

A. There were a number of fundamental innovations during that period that are closely linked to the construction of new maps . First, the fact that these discoveries allowed us to perceive and conquer a larger area of ​​the Mediterranean , which is where maps were born. The first were nautical charts, such as the Catalan chart, to name one of the best we have. The Catalan chart works very well because it's narrow in space, because this space is perceived as if it were two-dimensional, without considering that the Earth is round. When it's elongated, the projection space increases. After a century, at the end of the 1500s, this capacity allowed us to construct real maps of the Earth. I say real because for the first time in human history, and this is a true innovation, maps allow us to see the space we inhabit as it is, but on the maps themselves, we also begin to determine what is central and what is lateral. The other great change that occurs is very interesting, since for the first time, Europe is seen and perceived as "our space." It is no coincidence that the production of these first maps coincides precisely with the first History of Europe. This change, this perception of our centrality, is the true beginning of the political, geographical, and identity-based idea of ​​the West.

Q. In your book you explain that in China, for example, the East doesn't exist and that they represent maps with Europe displaced...

A. Yes, it's an exercise I always suggest to students and also to older students: search Google for 'World Map China'. One of the first results of such a search is the map of the world as Chinese people see it in school. And on this map, China is seen in the center, while we are a small dot in the upper left corner, and I'm referring to all of Europe, a small dot. In other words, the Chinese student sitting in the back row of class doesn't even see us, and that's how they've perceived Europe throughout history.

"On the Chinese world map, China is seen right in the center, while we are a small dot in the upper left corner."

Q. Does the construction of the West also imply an over-dimensioning? Has this idea of ​​the world dominated culturally since the 16th century?

A. Yes, of course, because we can talk about the map, like the Mercator projection , which is the first great example and which also functions as an over-dimension of the West. But it's not just a problem for geographers; it's reflected in all the cultural perceptions and historical reconstructions made during that period. Therefore, we can say that history begins in Europe, because that's where the narrative begins, and it's a markedly imperial history that begins with Spain and Portugal and continues with that of the British Empire , which is the one inherited by the United States.

Q. Why is the Western idea failing to take root in Asia?

A.- English and European colonization in general, which occurred between the 18th and 19th centuries, was so strong and radicalized that it was very difficult for it to take root, because it was the idea of ​​the conquerors. Ultimately, what countries like France and England used in these centuries of pure colonialism were nothing more than reused ancient Greek ideas. That is, the idea that the East is an indistinct region where everyone is affected by the same climate that leads to the same attitudes: they are indolent, they like luxury, they are doomed to tyrannies, and above all, they are immobile: there is no history there. And this concept remains the same as it is in the 20th century. For example, if we think simply about the cultural aspect, which is not the most important, it is directly a construction of universities, where the subject of History is really European History . That is to say, the history of the world is purely Western; the rest is mostly art, religion, and language, more or less. But the East itself doesn't exist; it's a European construct, while the very idea of ​​the West today is also somewhat false, because it ultimately represents the United States, when in reality it would be Europe...

"The English and European colonization that took place between the 18th and 19th centuries was so radicalized that it was very difficult to achieve."

Q. Is Trump right that the focus has shifted toward Asia?

A. Yes, I think there are two directions. In one sense, there is a multipolarity that seems to be the contemporary reaction to the American-style globalization of the late 20th century. This multipolarity is comprised of China, Russia, India, the United States, and divided parts of Europe, etc. In another sense, there is Asia, which has completed the decolonization process and is now the protagonist of a technically new history. Asia, or rather, the eastern part of the Eurasian macrocontinent, now has an impressive capacity to influence the future.